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THE ATROPHIED RULE-MAKING POWERS OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CORNELIUS J. PECKt
THE days of the National Labor Relations Board have never been peaceful.
Even the most cautious person may safely predict that it will be a long time,
if ever that time should come, before the business of the NLRB will settle
down to a quiet state of affairs. The Board regulates an area of our society in
which economic pressures are tremendous, personal convictions are strongly
held, and political significance is easily attached to actions taken. Moreover,
the experimental Wagner Act,' which it was given to administer in 1935, has
since been twice subjected to major revisions--once by the Taft-Hartley Act
of 1947,2 and more recently by the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959.3 In each case competing forces have produced legislative
compromises whose ambiguities constitute the seeds for future controversies. 4
Broad policy questions demand solution and present opportunities for debate
on substantive issues of great importance.
It is, then, with reservation that one undertakes a critical analysis of a pro-
cedural matter: the Board's failure to utilize its rule-making powers. Never-
theless, recent developments make it appear appropriate to do so.
This subject is, of course, only one of the procedural matters which have
drawn the attention of lawyers familiar with the activities of the Board. In
1958 the American Bar Association's Labor Law Section, with the approval
of the Association's House of Delegates, made seven general recommendations
for changes in NLRB procedures. Among the recommendations which the
Labor Law Section made to the Board was:
The Board should reconsider its view that its decisional policies on such
matters as jurisdictional standards and contract-bar rules do not come
within the rule-making requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act.6
tProfessor of Law, University of Washington.
1. NLRA, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1958), as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 153-87 (Supp. I, 1959).
2. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 153-87 (Supp. I, 1959).
3. NLRA, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 187, 401-531 (Supp. I, 1959).
Other relatively minor amendments have been made. 63 Stat. 880 (1949) ; 65 Stat. 601
(1951).
4. See NLRB v. Teamsters Union, 362 U.S. 274, 289-90 (1960). See also, Cox, The
Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MiNN. L. REV.
257, 266 (1959).
5. 42 LAB. REL. REP. 492, 513 (1958).
6. 42 LAB. REL. REP. 513 (1958).
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A special committee of the Labor Law Section was appointed to work with
the Board in bringing about a resolution of the difficulties which led to both
this and the other recommendations.
Summarized, the Board's response to the rule-making criticism was that
while the Board has afforded the public a large measure of participation in
its policy-making activities by inviting the filing of amicus briefs by interested
parties, the Board's procedures are designed primarily to develop policy in
connection with adjudication and the decision of actual cases. Accordingly, the
Board believed no alteration in its rule-making activities to be necessary.
7
This constituted but a slight change from the Board's 1956 view of its func-
tions which it stated in reply to the inquiry made by the House Subcommittee
on Government Operations, then studying Administrative Organization Pro-
cedure and Practice. At that time the Board's view was that it had
uniformly regarded itself as essentially a quasi-judicial rather than a rule-
making agency. The Board, therefore, like the courts, has not made it a
practice to issue broad invitations to representatives of labor, industry, or
the public generally to submit their views regarding a proposed decision
even though many of its decisions have an impact far beyond their impact
on the parties involved."
While the Board's reply to the American Bar Association reflects some
change in attitude toward the desirability of briefs amicus curiae, the belief ex-
pressed upon an earlier occasion no doubt still prevails.
Broad public participation would necessarily involve delay and diffusion
of issues in disposition of specific cases, contrary to sound judicial practice
and the special need for speedy resolution of labor disputes brought to
the Board for determination. 9
Indeed, the ABA Section, with the approval of the House of Delegates,
reached the conclusion that nothing was to be gained by additional efforts to
work with the Board, and that the Association should, instead, direct its efforts
to obtaining remedial action by legislation.10
The Board's conclusion that it does not engage in rule-making activities, but
that instead it limits its activities to the ad hoc resolution of issues in the par-
ticular cases coming before it, is demonstrably wrong. The related conclusion
of the Board, that the rule-making processes are not adaptable to work of the
7. 45 LAE. REL. REP. 407, 409 (1959).
8. STAFF OF HOUSE ComiTTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
SURVEY AND STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE IN THE
FEDERAL AGENCIES-AGENcY RESPONSE TO QUESTIONNAIRE 1811 (Comm. Print 1957).
9. Ibid.
10. 45 LAB. REL. REP. 407 (1959), 46 A.B.A.J. 455 (1960); 46 LAB. REX. REP. 343
(1960). See also 44 L.R.R.M. 26 (1958), and Report of Proceedings of the Section of
Labor Relation Law, 1959, pp. 116-25. Activities of the Board in rule-making were also
subjected to the criticism of committees of the Administrative Law Section of the Ameri-
can Bar Association. See Berger, Report of the Committee on Agency Rule-making, 11
AD. LAW BuLL. 275, 280 (1959).
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nature which it performs, is refuted by analysis of its recent activities. This
analysis indicates that rule-making is exactly what the Board has engaged in,
although without compliance with the requirements of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act or the beneficial support of its statutory authorization to adopt
substantive rules. The Board's failure to use rule-making procedures may
have been the cause of some of its recent difficulty in securing judicial accept-
ance of newly promulgated doctrines. Greater difficulties are foreseeable unless
a change is made. In addition, the Board's restriction of its activities to the
ad hoc or quasi-judicial form has caused it to forego the substantial benefits
which may be derived from an intelligent combination of adjudication and rule
making.
Finally, the NLRB's attempt to limit its activities to a quasi-judicial form
of activity provides an operating model for those who wish to consider the
much discussed question of whether the administrative process should be fur-
ther judicialized. While judicialization has long been the objective of a portion
of the bar, in recent years the proposal has gained support in the recommenda-
tions made by the Second Hoover Commission 11 and the American Bar Asso-
ciation 12 that an administrative court be established. Within the last year the
controversial subject figured in a significant debate appearing in the pages of
this Journal, in which Louis J. Hector, former CAB Commissioner, advocated
a fractionalization of the adminstrative process along the line of the traditional
separation of powers concept.13 In reply, Earl W. Kintner, Chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission, argued that policy could best be devised and im-
plemented by an agency which combined and utilized those powers in an in-
telligent fashion.' 4
Within the last three months the already famous Landis Report was is-
sued, containing a powerful argument that the real issue presented in the
problem of policy formulation is not whether the planning function should be
transferred from administrative agencies to the executive or some other au-
thority. Recognizing that some functions which are more truly planning than
adjudicative have been forced into the latter mold, the report acknowledges the
11. CoMIssIoN or ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT,
REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 87-88 (1955). With respect to the activities
of the NLRB, the recommendation was tempered with the additional recommendation that
Congress study whether the Labor Section of the Administrative Court should have orig-
inal or appellate jurisdiction.
12. 42 A.B.A.J. 370, 374 (1956).
13. Hector, Problems of the CAB and The Independent Regulatory Commissions,. 69
YALE L.J. 931 (1960).
14. IKintner, The Current Ordeal of the Administrative Process: In Reply to Mr.
Hector, 69 YALE L.J. 965 (1960). See also, Berger, Removal of Judicial Functions from
Federal Trade Commission to a Trade Court: A Reply to Mr. Kintner, 59 MICH. L. REV.
199 (1960).
15. SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES
TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (Comm. Print 1960).
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value to those formulating policy of the information and knowledge which can
be acquired in the process of adjudication. The issue is seen instead as being
how the planning function may be conferred upon persons with the capacity
and time to discharge that function, using flexible procedures in their search
for ideas and policies. 16 Indeedwith respect to the NLRB, not only was the
suggestion of a further separation of functions rejected, but instead the recom-
mendation was made that the separation effected by the Taft-Hartley Act be-
tween the Board and the General Counsel be abolished.' 7
The conclusions to be drawn on these broader problems of judicialization
and policy formulation from analysis of the Board's experience must, of course,
be tempered with a realization that that experience is largely the product of
the Board's own peculiar situation. The statute which it administers, the in-
terests which it regulates, and even the men who staff it as well as the rapid-
ity with which changes occur weigh heavily in an evaluation of the procedures
followed. Nevertheless, some conclusions of general import may be reached.
RULE-MAKING UNDER THE ADmINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
The NLRB has issued no formal rules other than those governing the prac-
tice and procedure to be followed in cases brought before the agency. This
is not for lack of statutory authorization to make substantive rules. On the
contrary, section 6 of the National Labor Relations Act 18 specifically pro-
vides:
The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and
rescind in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act,
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of this Act.
The Board does not deny that this authorization is broad enough to encompass
substantive rule-making powers which its words appear to include.'0 Indeed,
what there is in the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act indicates that
the present language of the section was adopted in favor of other language
which might have deprived the Board of substantive rule-making powers.20)
16. Id. at 18-19.
17. Id. at 58-64.
18. 49 Stat. 452 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1958).
19. STAFF OF HousE COMMTTIEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., IST SESS.,
SURVEY AND STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE IN THE
FEDERAL AGENcIES-AGENCY RESPONSE TO QUESTIONNAIRE 1812 (Comm. Print 1957).
20. Section 6 of the House version of the Taft-Hartley Act as originally reported,
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), provided:
The Board and the Administrator, respectively, shall have authority from time to
time, in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, to make,
amend, and rescind such regulations as may be necessary to carry out their respec-
tive functions under this Act.
This provision differed from the equivalent provision of the Wagner Act in its reference
to the Administrative Procedure Act and elimination of the authority to make "rules" as
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Instead, the Board's rejection of the rule-making process is apparently based
upon the conclusion that this procedure is not adaptable to the work which
the Board performs.21
An understanding of what forthright rule-making by the Board would in-
volve requires a brief survey of the pertinent provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act.22 First, what is a rule and what is rule-making are defined in
Section 2 (c) of the Act:
"Rule" means the whole or any part of any agency statement of general
or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, in-
terpret, or prescribe law or policy or to describe the organization, pro-
cedure, or practice requirements of any agency . . "Rule-making"
means agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a
rule.2
Much of what is thus defined as rule-making is exempt by other provisions
from the procedural requirements established by the Act for the rule-making
process. Thus, the Board's interpretative rules, general statements of policy,
rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice, rules relating to agency
management or personnel, are exempt. 24
The procedural requirements which are imposed on the nonexempt aspects
of rule-making are not oppressive or burdensome. It would be necessary for
the Board to publish general notice of the proposed rule-making in the Federal
Register, setting out the time and place of the proceedings, reference to the
portion of the National Labor Relations Act under which the rule was pro-
posed, and the terms or substance of the contemplated rule.25 The Act does
not require an adversary or trial type hearing, or even the reception of oral
testimony or views. All that would be required of the Board would be an op-
portunity for interested persons "to participate in rule making through sub-
opposed to regulations. The majority of the House Committee on Labor Education did
not mention this change in their report. However, the minority members saw it as an at-
tempt to deprive the Board of the authority to make substantive rules. They said,
Under section 6 of the bill the Board and the Administrator are authorized to pre-
scribe regulations as may be necessary in the manner provided for by the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. This is a limitation upon the present authority of the Board
under the National Labor Relations Act "to make, amend, and rescind such rules
and regulations" as may be necessary to carry out its duties.... It seems clear that
it is the intent of the authors to eliminate the statutory authority of the Board to
issue, in addition to procedural regulations, substantive changes which under the
Administrative Procedure Act might be construed as "substantive rules."
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1947).
From the reinsertion of the authority to make "rules" as opposed to regulations, one
may infer an intent to preserve substantive rule-making power. The matter is not, how-
ever, the subject of comment in the Conference Report.
21. Note 8 supra.
22. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958).
23. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1958).
24. 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1958).
25. Ibid.
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mission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity to
present the same orally .... ," 26 The effective date of rules so adopted would
have to be as least 30 days after their publication in the Federal Register,
unless the Board found good cause for establishing an earlier effective date.27
But, aside from this, no other restraints would be imposed upon the Board,
nor would the Board be compelled to follow detailed techniques utilized by
other agencies. Indeed, as Professor Davis says,
The federal APA makes no attempt to produce uniformity of rule-making
procedures. Instead, it provides minimum standards for party partici-
pation, not going beyond the requirement of opportunity to make written
presentation and to "appear." 2s
In short, the Act would impose but slight burdens if the Board decided to al-
low the parties who are to be affected by a rule to participate in a limited way
in its formulation. The absence of detailed prescriptions affords a freedom
and flexibility for the formulation of policy pursuant to procedures designed
for the particular occasion and problem. Perhaps the only objection to rule-
making which has an appearance of validity is that of the delay which results
from giving interested persons the opportunity to present views as well as
from suspending the effectiveness of rules for thirty days after publication.
This objection deserves consideration.
Of course, policy formulation could not be eliminated from the Board's ad-
judicatory processes merely by the adoption upon certain occasions of formal
rule-making procedures. The traditional tripartite classification of governmen-
tal powers is a great assistance in the analysis of problems, but it cannot change
the nature of those problems. Though the definitions of the Administrative
Procedure Act might suggest otherwise, rule-making and adjudication do not
constitute separate, distinct, and unblendable aspects of governmental activity;
on the contrary, upon occasions they are inseparable and merged aspects of
the same problem. Even courts, which certainly exemplify the judicial process,
formulate policy in the course of adjudication, through the implementation of a
statutory purpose as well as in judicial legislation filling in gaps left by legis-
lative oversight. But for the most part they attempt to limit their policy formu-
lation by adherence to precedent, avoiding as undesirable dictum any policy
pronouncement beyond that necessary for disposition of the case. Change
normally falls within the province of the legislature. On the other hand, rules
though stated in general terms and given only future effect may affect only
one or so few parties as to take on the appearance of adjudication. Inability
to classify all problems as presenting only an occasion for adjudication or rule-
26. 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1958). This section of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act does make the sections governing adjudication applicable to rule-mak-
ing proceedings which are required by statute to be made on a record after agency hear-
ing, but there is no such requirement of a record hearing in the National Labor Relations
Act.
27. 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1002(a), 1003(c) (1958).
28. 1 DAvis, ADmNISTRATIvW LAW § 6.01, at 360 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAvis].
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making need not, however, lead to abandonment of the distinction. Used in-
telligently, the distinction set up in the Administrative Procedure Act offers
great assistance in determining how to proceed in most cases. The determina-
tion of how changes should be made certainly involves a different set of con-
siderations for an administrative agency than it does for a court. For either,
however, failure to heed the distinction may result in problems being handled
in the wrong way.
JURISDICTIONAL RULE-MAKING
As originally enacted, the National Labor Relations Act empowered the
Board to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice "affect-
ing commerce."'2 In a relatively short time it became clear that Congress had
thereby exercised the full extent of its powers to regulate commerce, making
the test of the Board's jurisdiction whether the effect of an employer's activi-
ties on interstate commerce could be said to be de rminimnis.30 The Board, how-
ever, both from lack of funds and the necessity of concentrating its efforts upon
the most important problems, has never exercised the full extent of its powers.
Accordingly, during the first years of the act the questions which constantly
recurred were whether the activities of a particular employer "affected" com-
merce, and, if so, whether it would effectuate the policies of the act for the
Board to assert its jurisdiction in that case. This problem was handled on an
ad hoc case-by-case basis, subject, of course, to the control which developing
precedents played. In October, 1950, however, the Board handed down a
series of unanimous decisions setting forth the standards which would govern
the future exercise of its jurisdiction. Its avowed purpose was to avoid the
necessity of Board consideration of these matters on an individual basis. The
decisions were said to be the result of a long study of the pattern emerging
from past decisions.31 Hence, they might be considered more in the nature
of a codification of the existing law than, in the language of the Administrative
Procedure Act, "the formulation, amendment, or repeal" of agency policy. In
any event, it does not appear that interested parties were invited to participate
in the formulation of these standards.
On July 1 and 15, 1954, the Board issued two press releases establishing
new and detailed standards for determining whether the Board would assert
29. NLRA, § 10, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. 160(a) (1958). Commerce was
defined as meaning". . . trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among
the several States, or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United
States and any State .... " Affecting commerce was defined to mean ". . . in commerce,
or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or
tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of
commerce." NLRA, §§ 2(6), -(7), 49 Stat. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(6), -(7) (1956).
30. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 608 (1939); cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
31. 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 5 (1950).
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its jurisdiction in the future.3  The new standards were said to be based upon
a study and reappraisal of Board experience with the 1950 standards, and
upon changed economic conditions. Though there was disagreement among
the members of the Board as to the extent of the policy changes involved,
there is little doubt that some change in policy was intended; unlike the 1950
standards, these standards did not purport to be merely a restatement of what
the Board had previously done. The studies upon which the new standards
were based were carried out by a committee of legal assistants to the Board
members, but again, apparently, without the benefit of public participation. The
standards were never published in the Federal Register or the Code of Federal
Regulations, and they were made effective "immediately." Anyone looking
at the press releases would find it difficult, if not impossible, to advance any
rational distinction between their contents and the contents of rules and regu-
lations which regularly appear in the Federal Register and later find their
way into the Code of Federal Regulations.
Apparently the members of the Board did not believe that they had engaged
in rule-making. In any event, when the first decision applying the new stan-
dards finally issued on October 24, 1954,34 although one of the two dissenting
members argued that the Board had mistakenly taken on a legislative function,
none of the opinions discussed the necessity of compliance with, or at least
exemption from, the rule-making requirements of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.
This episode in the 1954 change of jurisdictional standards should be noted
in evaluating the Board's claim that the broad public participation involved in
rule-making would involve delay and diffusion of issues in disposition of
specific cases. Activities which certainly appear to have been rule-making were
completed on July 15, whereas the first adjudication involving those same
principles did not appear until more than three months later! At least in this
area, then, the 30 day waiting period before A.P.A. rules can become effective
would be at most a slight hindrance to Board operations.
The Board revised its jurisdictional standards again in October, 1958. The
action was expressly explained as a consequence of the Supreme Court de-
cision in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board,8 5 which had created a "no-
32. NLRB Press Releases R-445, -449, 34 L.R.R.M. 75 (1954).
33. The first decision of the Board announcing and applying the new jurisdictional
standards was Breeding Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 493, 35 L.R.R.M. 1020 (1954). The
majority spoke of "revision" of the old standards, and of "our new jurisdictional policy."
According to its estimate, the changes made in the standards would reduce the Board's
case load by no more than 10 per cent and, in terms of employees, would affect no more
than 1 per cent of the total number of employees subject to the broadest reach of the
agency's jurisdiction.
34. Ibid.
35. 353 U.S. 1 (1957). The Board's announcement of its 1958 standards stated, "We
are taking this action as a consequence of the situation to which the Supreme Court
referred in the case of Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board. Therein the Supreme Court
adverted to 'a vast no-man's land, subject to regulation by no agency or court,' and de-
[Vol. 70: 729
NLRB RULE-MAKING
man's land" where recourse to neither state nor federal law was possible. The
change clearly constituted a substantial alteration in Board policy. Adoption
of the new standards was preceded this time by the issuance of a press release
in July setting forth the proposed standards, establishing September 1, 1958,
as the intended effective date, and inviting comments by interested persons.
3 6
On October 2, 1958, one month after the previously announced intended
effective date, the Board issued another press release announcing the revised
standards, and giving them "immediate effect."37 Neither of those press re-
leases were published in the Federal Register as notices of proposed rule-
making under the Administrative Procedure Act. Nor have the standards
found their way into the Code of Federal Regulations, as would have been the
case if there had been compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act. A
Board decision discussing the adoption of the new standards did not appear
until a month and a half later, on November 14, 1958.38 The decision, filed in
a representation case, laid down Board policy for an entirely different problem,
one presented in unfair labor practice cases: whether the new standards
should apply to unfair labor practices which allegedly occurred when an em-
ployer was not subject to regulation under the then existing standards. It was
decided that a retroactive effect should be given to the new standards, sub-
jecting to Board sanctions conduct which did not appear to be regulated when
it occurred.
Since that time there has been another, more particularized, change in the
Board's jurisdictional standards. The Board now accepts cases involving the
hotel industry which had previously been subject to a blanket exemption. Like
the general 1958 change this change was frankly acknowledged to be in re-
sponse to a Supreme Court decision ;39 it thus constituted a change in agency
policy. However, the press release 40 announcing the proposed standards for
Board assertion of jurisdiction with respect to hotels, and inviting interested
parties to file briefs or comments, was not published in the Federal Register.
The final standards, which also took "immediate effect," were again announced
in a press release 41 which was not published in the Federal Register, and they
have not appeared in the Code of Federal Regulations.
These revised standards, promulgated without the support of the Board's
statutory rule-making powers or compliance with the provisions of the Ad-
clared: (1) 'Congress is free to change the situation;' and (2) 'The National Labor Re-
lations Board can greatly reduce the area of no-man's land by reasserting its jurisdic-
tion....'
"Today, we are announcing this action, so that more individuals, labor organizations
and employers may invoke the right and protections afforded by the statute." NLRB Press
Release R-576, October 2, 1958, 42 L.R.R.M. 96 (1958).
36. NLRB Press Release R-570, July 22, 1958, 42 LAB. RE. REP. 363 (1958).
37. NLRB Press Release R-576, October 2, 1958, 42 L.R.R.M. 96 (1958).
38. Siemons Mailing Service, 122 N.L.R.B. 81, 43 L.R.R.M. 1056 (1958).
39. Hotel Employees Local 255 v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958).
40. NLRB Press Release R-586, January 11, 1959, 43 LAB. REL. REP. 233 (1958).
41. NLRB Press Release R-610, May 14, 1959, 44 LAB. RE.L. RFP. 70 (1959).
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ministrative Procedure Act, have received congressional ratification in the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 ;42 thus, if they
were ever subject to attack, they are probably beyond the point of challenge
today.43 Yet, one hesitates to think of the confusion and injustice which would
have resulted had it been held that the Board's failure to comply with the
Administrative Procedure Act provided a defense to one charged with an
unfair labor practice falling within the areas affected by the 1954 or 1958
changes in jurisdictional standards.
CONTRACT-BAR RULE-MAIKING
The Board's contract-bar doctrine is another instance of rule-making with-
out use of the NLRB's statutory rule-making powers or compliance with the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. Briefly stated, this doc-
trine is one which the Board evolved, without express statutory authority,
to determine when it would disrupt an established collective bargaining rela-
tionship by holding an election upon the petition of a rival union. In those in-
stances in which the Board concludes that emphasis must be given to pre-
serving the stability of an existing collective bargaining relationship, a current
contract between the employer and the incumbent union constitutes a "bar" to
the election; in other situations the weight to be given employee freedom of
choice leads to a conclusion that the contract should not constitute a "bar."
42. Section 701(a) of the act, 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (Supp. I, 1959),
dealt with the no-man's land problem discussed note 30 supra, by adding a new subsection
to section 14 of the NLRA. It cedes jurisdiction to state courts and agencies of those labor
disputes which the Board declined to assert its jurisdiction, with a proviso that the Board
may not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would have
asserted its jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959. The changes
discussed above had all been accomplished by that date, and thus were given congressional
approval in this section.
The language of the new subsection is:
The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules adopted
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction over
any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in the opinion
of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently sub-
stantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That the Board shall
not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert
jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
The recognition thus given to establishing standards by rule of decision might be taken
as approval of the procedures used by the Board in developing its former standards. But
the reference to the Administrative Procedure Act also suggests that in appropriate situa-
tions Congress would desire the Board to proceed according to the provisions of that Act.
Furthermore, section 606 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
73 Stat. 540 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 526 (Supp. I, 1959), specifically provides that the pro-
visions of the Administrative Procedure Act shall be applicable to the issuance, amend-
ment, or rescission of any rules or regulations, or any adjudication, authorized by the pro-
visions of the 1959 Act.
43. See notes 103-08 infra and accompanying text. Rules establishing jurisdictional
standards might have been considered "procedural" and hence exempt by section 4(a) of
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On March 28, 1958, again by press release,44 the Board invited interested
parties to submit briefs on a number of pending cases, clearly indicating that
it was considering revising the then current contract-bar doctrine. At a later
date, but in advance of argument in the case, the Board made public the
various views expressed in the briefs filed.4 5 In doing so, of course, it com-
mendably went beyond the limited requirements for public participation which
are found in the Administrative Procedure Act. In June, 1958, the Board
held a two-day hearing at which it heard the arguments of interested parties 4 6
Not until September, 1958, did the Board issue a series of decisions setting
forth its revised contract-bar rules.47
The cases selected as the vehicles for announcement of these new rules were
thus held pending for an extended period of time. No doubt the parties to
those cases would agree with the Board's conclusion that "broad public parti-
cipation involves delay and diffusion" which is incompatible with the disposi-
tion of cases on an ad hoc basis. They might, however, also point out that if
the Board had adopted A.P.A. rule-making procedures it could have decided
their cases under the former rules, which were not intolerable, and thus have
avoided the inevitably unsettling effect that pending elections have upon labor
relations and production. It is doubtful that they believed that preservation of
the fiction that the Board does not engage in rule-making, but instead exer-
cises only quasi-judicial functions in deciding particular cases, justified the
turmoil and uncertainty to which they were subjected.
For fiction it clearly was to anyone reading the cases. For example, the
Board's decision in Deluxe Metal Furniture Co.48 involved the abandonment
of a principle known as the General Electric X-Ray doctrine, which the Board
the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1958), but
this is unlikely considering their substantive importance. Nevertheless, the standards have
been so considered by NLRB's Committee on Revision of Rules and Regulations and
Statements of Procedure. Section 2.32, Recommended Rules of Practice, published as a
special supplement to the Labor Relations Reporter, July 18, 1960. They might also be
considered "interpretative rules" and thus exempt under the same section of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. Cf. Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
But again their use as the substantive governing rule rather than as a guide to that rule
precludes such a classification.
It is of interest that in its decision in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S.
1 (1957), the Supreme Court specifically pointed out that it was not passing upon the
validity of any declination of jurisdiction or of any set of jurisdictional standards. Id. at 4.
44. NLRB Press Release W-549, March 28, 1959, p. 6, 41 LAB. RL. REP. 459 (1957).
45. 42 LAB. REL. REP. 135 (1958).
46. 42 LAB. REL. REP. 223 (1958).
47. Keystone Coat, Apron & Towel Supply Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 880, 42 L.R.R.M. 1456
(1958) ; Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 901, 42 L.R.R.M. 1460 (1958) ; Deluxe
Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995, 42 L.R.R.M. 1470 (1958); Pacific Coast Ass'n
of Pulp & Paper Mfrs., 121 N.L.R.B. 990, 42 L.R.R.M. 1477 (1958) ; Appalachian Shale
Prods. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160, 42 L.R.R.M. 1506 (1958); General Extrusion Co., 121
N.L.R.B. 1165, 42 L.R.R.M. 1508 (1958).
48. 121 N.L.R.B. 995, 42 L.R.R.M. 1470 (1958).
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had applied for more than twelve years.49 The Board went further than simp-
ly "legislating" this change in policy; dealing with many hypothetical fact
situations which could not conceivably have been involved in the particular
case, the Board announced in considerable detail the applicable rules under
the new policy.50 Other cases announcing other changes in the contract-bar
doctrine likewise ranged far beyond the issues involved. Indeed, the results in
some of the cases which served as vehicles for announcement of the new poli-
cies were the same as they would have been if the old rules had not been
abandoned.51
In the Deluxe Metal Furniture Company case, however, the petitioning
union was not so fortunate, and accordingly urged the Board that it make its
doctrinal changes prospectively effective, avoiding thereby a retroactive appli-
cation of the new rules barring an election. To this suggestion the Board said:
[T] o adopt these revisions of contract-bar policy and then allow the instant
proceeding as an exception without permitting a similar exception to all
pending cases would be inequitable. To establish an in futuro rule for all
pending cases would create an administrative monstrosity. The judicial
practice of applying each pronouncement of a rule of law to the case in
which the issue arises and to all pending cases in whatever stage is tradi-
tional and, we believe, the wiser course to follow.
2
49. The doctrine was first expounded in General Elec. X-Ray Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 997,
18 L.R.R.M. 1047 (1946). According to that doctrine, a contract executed by an employer
with knowledge that a rival union claimed to represent the employees involved did not
bar an election if the rival union filed a petition for an election within 10 days after mak-
ing the claim. In the Deluxe Metal Furniture case, the Board decided that it would not
give such effect to bare claims of interest in employees, but instead would process only
petitions filed during the period falling within 150 days but more than 60 days prior to
the termination date of an existing contract or filed before the execution of a new contract
if none were existing.
50. Thus the Board announced what rule it would apply when a new contract was
executed and a petition filed on the same day, though this was not the fact pattern in the
case at hand. It stated that midnight would be the cutoff time for determining when a con-
tract was signed even though execution was the result of continuous bargaining commenc-
ing before midnight. It stated what its policy would be with respect to processing petitions
which were prematurely filed under the new rules it had just adopted. It stated what would
be treated as the terminal date of a contract of "unreasonable duration" though it did not
find the contract involved to be governed by that rule. The rules were also laid down for
the effect to be given contracts prematurely extended by the parties during the original
term, the effect to be given late notices of a desire to modify an existing contract, the
effect to be given mid-term modifications of contracts, as well as the effect which would
be given contracts prematurely terminated, though, of course, none of these inconsistent
fact patterns were involved.
51. Keystone Coat, Apron & Towel Supply Co., smpra note 47; General Extrusion
Co., supra note 47. Two other cases presented the novel situation in which one of the new
rules announced would have produced a different result, but another of the new rules re-
stored the former status of the contract as a bar. Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp & Paper
Mfrs., supra note 47; Appalachian Shale Prods. Co., supra note 47.
52. 121 N.L.R.B. at 1006-07; 42 L.R.R.M. at 1477.
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Of course, the inequity of denying an exception to all pending cases, as well
as the "administrative monstrosity" which the Board feared it might create,
could have been avoided were the Board not wedded to the fiction that it acts
in a quasi-judicial capacity alone. A rule could have been adopted which would
not have affected pending cases or existing contracts, but which would have
been applicable instead only to those cases arising under contracts executed
thirty days after publication of the new rule in the Federal Register. It is
probably to be regretted, for the history of colorful expression, that the
Board's rules did not permit the petitioning union to file as an appendix to the
Deluxe opinion its description of what sort of a "judicial" creation the Board
had spawned in a decision which devoted seven pages to a hypothetical dis-
cussion of how it would decide cases involving other parties and other facts,
and only four pages, including those dealing with the argument on retroactivi-
ty, to the case at hand.
Until quite recently it appeared that the Board had exceptional freedom in
developing and changing the rules, such as its contract-bar doctrine, which it
applies in representation cases,53 because of a peculiar immunity from judi-
cial review. Direct judicial review was precluded-so the view went-because
the National Labor Relations Act evinces a scheme for channeling all review
of questions which arise in the determination of a bargaining representative
to the judicial review arising from an employer's refusal to bargain with a
newly selected representative5 4 Of course this avenue of review was not open
to a union defeated in an election. It thus provided no remedy to a union
which believed that its contract with an employer had not been given proper
effect as a bar to the election of another union. If the union whose contract
was held not to be a bar won the election it continued to be the bargaining
agent of the employees and the question became moot. Thus, only employers
were believed to be in a position to challenge Board action on contract-bar
matters.
However, the recent Supreme Court decision in Leedom v. Kyne 55 has
probably destroyed this supposed immunity to judicial review. There, in a
representation case, the Supreme Court held that a Federal District Court
had jurisdiction under the general provisions of the Judicial Code 56 to correct
Board action which had admittedly been taken in violation of the statutory
53. Representation cases are those in which the Board upon petitions properly filed
proceeds under the powers conferred upon it by section 9 of the NLRA, 61 Stat. 143 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 159 (1958), to determine what constitutes an appropriate unit of employees for
the purposes of collective bargaining, and, to hold elections to determine which, if any
union, represents the employees in that unit. They are to be distinguished from the trial
of charges of unfair labor practices which are defined by section 8 of the Act and as to
which the Board proceeds under the powers conferred upon it by section 10 of the Act.
54. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); cf. Switchmen's Union v. National Media-
tion Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943) ; Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697 (1945).
55. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
56. 62 Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958).
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provisions.5 7 This was viewed as action taken in excess of delegated powers,
and hence action outside the jurisdiction of the Board. It was said not to be
"review" of Board action in the sense of that term as used in the National
Labor Relations Act.58
Accordingly, it is possible to give Leedom v. Kyne a limited reading, making
it applicable only where the Board acts in excess of statutory authority. By
this view it would provide no check upon Board action taken with respect
to nonstatutory Board developed doctrine such as that of the contract bar.
On the other hand, it is difficult to believe that any statute has conferred the
power upon an agency to act arbitrarily or capriciously with respect to the in-
terests of the private parties appearing before it. Thus, Board action which
can be labeled arbitrary or capricious might be said to be action in excess of
statutory authority, outside the jurisdiction of the Board, and hence subject to
direct review under the principle of Leedom v. Kyne. Or, since Leedom v.
Kyne establishes the proposition that the National Labor Relations Act does
not preclude judicial review, arbitrary and capricious action might be set aside
under the provisions of section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 9
Recent decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
cases involving direct review of Board action by the district court clearly
point the way to review of contract-bar determinations in the guise of deter-
mining whether the agency decision was within the discretionary powers con-
ferred upon the Board by the statute.6 0 Indeed, its recent decision in Leedom
57. NLRA, § 9(b), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1958), provides that
". the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes [of
collective bargaining] if such unit includes both professional employees and employees
who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote
for inclusion in such unit .... "
The Board included nine nonprofessional employees in a unit with 233 professional
employees because, while the nine were not professional employees, they "share[d] a close
community of employment interests with [the professional employees, and their inclusion
would not] destroy the predominantly professional character of such a unit." 358 U.S. at
185-86.
58. Id. at 188.
59. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958). The pertinent language is: "Except
so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed
to agency discretion [a reviewing court] (e) . . . shall . . . set aside agency action, find-
ings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law ... "
If the introductory words "Except so far as" are given a literal reading rather than
treated as the equivalent of "except when," the Administrative Procedure Act provides no
basis for review beyond that established by Leedom v. Kyne itself. See 4 DAvis § 28.08, at
33-42.
60. Leedom v. IBEW, 278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Toolcraftsmen v. Leedom, 276
F2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1960), petition for cert. filed, 46 LAB. REF. REP. 403 (May 27, 1960,
No. 108) ; Leedom v. Norwich Conn. Printing Specialties, 275 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ;
National Biscuit Division v. Leedom, 265 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359




v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers" upholds the validity of one of the
changes in the contract-bar rules made in September, 1958. The change in-
volved the Board's replacement of its former rule that a contract with a term
of five years or less would bar an election if a substantial part of the industry
involved was covered by contracts of a similar term. The new rule provides
that in no event may a contract be a bar for a term of more than two years.
The conclusion of the court was characterized by the author of its decision as
one "reached with considerable difficulty." Upon balance of competing claims,
the court held retroactive application of the new rule constitutional. The
Board's argument that otherwise it would be precluded from giving the new
rule full effect for up to five years appeared particularly persuasive, and per-
haps presents a stronger case for retroactivity here than can be supplied with
respect to other changes in the contract-bar rules. While the opinion ends with
a statement that review by way of an original equity suit in the district court
will not lie, perusal of the opinion leaves little doubt that review was had upon
the merits.
Leedom v. Kyne also provided the jurisdictional basis for a successful at-
tack upon another of the new contract-bar doctrines in a suit brought in the
District Court for the Eastern District of New York.62 The court concluded
that the broad proposition formulated by the NLRB in the announcement of
its new doctrine failed to give weight to distinguishing factors in the case at
bar, and accordingly it issued an injunction nullifying the election that had
been held upon the petition of a rival union. In neither this opinion nor in
the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was there
a discussion of whether failure to comply with the rule-making requirements
of the Administrative Procedure Act invalidated the recently announced
contract-bar changes. 63
RULE-MIAKING IN UNIT DETERMINATIONS
The Board has engaged in a less obvious, and perhaps more defensible,
rule-making with respect to rules governing the severance of units of skilled
craftsmen from larger bargaining units of all production and maintenance
employees. This troublesome area is one in which difficulties were magnified
because of the competing interests of AFL and CIO unions on the one hand,
and divergent management views concerning the desirability of dealing with
one or several unions on the other.
Under the original Wagner Act the Board had decided that, if there had
been no prior history of bargaining upon a craft basis, it would not ordinarily
allow the severance of a unit of craft employees from a larger existing
unit with a substantial history of bargaining.6 4 In the Taft-Hartley amend-
61. 278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
62. Local 476, Industrial Workers v. McLeod, 46 LAB. REL. REP. 2454 (E.D.N.Y.
1960).
63. See notes 103-07 infra and accompanying text.
64. See American Can Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1939).
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ments a limitation was imposed upon the Board's power to refuse to grant
craft severance elections. Section 9(b) (2) of the Act was amended to pro-
vide that:
the Board shall not ... (2) decide that any craft unit is inappropriate
for such purposes [of collective bargaining] on the ground that a differ-
ent unit has been established by a prior Board determination, unless a
majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit vote against
separate representation .... 65
In 1948 the Board issued its decision in the National Tube case. 6 It gave
a strict and literal reading to the amendment, which by its terms prohibits
denial of craft severance only upon the basis of a prior Board determination
establishing a different unit. Accordingly, the Board held that due to the in-
tegrated nature of operations, as well as the history of bargaining upon a
broader basis, it would not authorize separate craft units in the basic steel
industry. This same conclusion was later reached with respect to the wet
milling,67 lumber,68 and aluminum industries.6 9
In 1954 the Board announced a change in policy in its American Potash
decision.70 Section 9(b) (2) was given a broader reading as favoring the
principle of craft severance. Accordingly, the Board stated that it would not
extend the practice of denying craft severance on an industry-wide basis. This
led to an abandonment of the Board's former rule-making practice whereby
determinations about the nature of an industry as a whole accompanied de-
cisions on petitions for individual units with separate craft status. The
Board, however, preserved the industry-wide rules which it had previously
adopted by stating that it would continue to decline to entertain petitions for
craft severance in the industries to which the National Tube doctrine had
already been applied. Moreover, the announcement in American Potash of
future policy with respect to the severance of craft and departmental units
in other, unrelated, cases itself constituted rule-making activity by the Board.
Both facets of the rule-making accomplished in the American Potash de-
cision were recently subjected to the critical review of the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. 71 In that
case, testing the correctness of the Board's unit determination, the employer
refused to bargain with the certified representative of a unit of craft em-
ployees working in its highly integrated flat glass manufacturing plant. The
Court of Appeals viewed the Board's American Potash decision as adopting
a flat rule that craft units must be split off from an established industrial
65. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2) (1958).
66. 76 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1948).
67. Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 362 (1948).
68. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1949).
69. Permanente Metals Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 804 (1950).
70. 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954).




unit whenever requested by a craft union, irrespective of the nature or degree
of integration in the industry and the history of bargaining in that industry.
This, the court thought, was in derogation of the Board's duty to decide
in each case what would be the appropriate bargaining unit. While recog-
nizing that the Board might develop its policies either by general rule or by
ad hoc decisions, the court condemned as arbitrary and discriminatory the
Board's action of formulating policies of general application and applying
them in the same case. The court found no reasonable explanation for the
Board's discrimination in favor of the four industries to which it had applied
the National Tube doctrine.72 Having condemned the conflict between the
Board policy determinations and its action in sometimes allowing craft repre-
sentation under precisely the same circumstances in which it is at other times
denied, the court denied enforcement of the Board's order.
While this appears to be the only set-back suffered by the Board thus far,
the probabilities are that there will be others. Though the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit recently rejected a similar attack upon the Board's
action in granting craft severance, it did so upon the ground that unlike
Pittsburgh Plate Glass the case before it did not involve an integrated indus-
try and not upon the ground that the Fourth Circuit decision was erroneous. 73
Some passages in the Pittsburgh Plate Glass opinion indicate that only
ad hoc, individualized unit determinations would be accepted by the Fourth
Circuit.74 However, its express recognition that the Board might develop its
policies by general rules,71; and the obvious necessity and inevitability of de-
veloping governing decisional principles, suggest that the court would have
approved the use of rules of general applicability which were properly formu-
lated in either the traditional quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative manner of
administrative agencies. It appears that the Board's action was rejected
because it departed so far from the judicial rule-making process in which
policies are developed and changed by a slow process of accretion, prolifera-
72. 270 F.2d at 174. See notes 65-69 supra.
73. NLRB v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 276 F2d 865 (7th Cir. 1960).
74. With respect to the exemption from craft severance established for the previously
mentioned four integrated industries, the court said,
Its policy with respect to the four industries is solely based, so far as we can see,
on its prior determination that in these industries craft representation will not be
tolerated. This position is not only open to the objections hereinbefore outlined, but
plainly constitutes a violation of the express provision of § 9(b) (2) of the statute,
which forbids the Board to decide that any craft unit is inappropriate on the ground
that a different unit has been established by a prior Board determination.
270 F.2d at 175. This statement may have been directed, however, not so much at the
making of broad industry policy determinations per se, but toward applying a broad in-
dustry policy determination with respect to four industries, including new plants estab-
lished in those industries, while refusing, upon the basis of another broad policy deter-
mination, to consider whether conditions in the industry involved should be given similar
effect.
75. 270 F.2d at 174.
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tion, and distinction of governing principles. Through blatant rule-making in
a quasi-judicial proceeding the Board exposed itself to charges of arbitrari-
ness and capriciousness. Forthright adoption of rule-making procedures un-
der the Administrative Procedure Act, with industry-wide determinations
on the appropriateness of craft severance-prospective in operation-set out
as the general governing principle in the absence of special circumstances,
might have succeeded where the disguise of the ad hoc method was insuffi-
cient.
RULE-MAKING AND HIRING HALLS
Union security clauses have been similarly troublesome for the NLRB.
Section 8(a) (3), as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, permits the execution
of a collective bargaining agreement requiring "as a condition of employment
membership . . . [in the contracting union] on or after the thirtieth day fol-
lowing the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such [col-
lective bargaining] agreement, whichever is the later . . . ." However, a pro-
viso to the section renders unjustifiable any discrimination against an em-
ployee for nonmembership in the union if the employer has reasonable
grounds for believing that ". . . membership was denied or terminated for
reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and
the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retain-
ing membership .... ,,7
Strict as these limitations are, after more than ten years of administering
the National Labor Relations Act with its Taft-Hartley amendments the
Board had not held the act violated by a contract requiring an employer to
obtain all his new employees through a union controlled and operated hiring
hall. Hiring halls have been a very important protection to employees from
the extortion and kick-back demands that petty supervisors might exact in
"shape-up" hiring on the waterfront, or in similar irregular hiring of occa-
sional employees. For employers, hiring halls have provided pools of skilled
labor, available without expensive recruiting activities.7 Avoiding a holding
of illegality per se, the Board required proof that either the contract itself
provided for an illegal discrimination in favor of union members, or that it
was in fact being administered in a discriminatory manner favoring union
members. 78
In 1957, however, a majority of the Board apparently became dissatisfied
with the results obtained by imposing upon the General Counsel the burden
of proving actual discrimination under a hiring hall arrangement. A case now
known as Mountain Pacific 79 served as the vehicle for announcement of the
76. NLRA, § 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1958).
77. HopKiNs, LABOR IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 33-35 (1948).
78. National Union of Marine Cooks, 90 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1950); Hunkin-Conkey
Constr. Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 433 (1951).
79. 119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1957). In an earlier case involving the same contract the Board
refused to pass upon the validity of the contract provisions governing hiring, but instead
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change in policy. Distortion of the traditional quasi-judicial form was perhaps
indicated by the fact that a dissenting opinion, warning that a change was
in the offing, was filed in December of 1957; but not until the end of March,
1958 did the majority opinion appear.
The majority view in Mountain Pacific was that a hiring hall agreement
was inherently discriminatory, and that no independent evidence of discrimi-
nation was necessary to establish a violation of the Act. But the majority be-
lieved that the inherently discriminatory impact of a hiring hall agreement
might be overcome if certain limitations upon the union's powers were both
made express in the contract and published to prospective employees. The
substance of the necessary limitations to be made in contract provisions was
then set out in the opinion.80
Change in policy and abandonment of former rules are, of course, a fami-
liar part of the judicial as well as the quasi-judicial process. However, the
proffering of advice on what contract provisions would be approved in future
cases, as done by the Board in Mountain Pacific, is at least a very unusual
aspect of either of those processes. It has the appearance of a rule prescribing
conduct for future negotiations and for contracts which are still to be exe-
cuted. It seems obvious that the standards for the future were stated to avoid
the flood of litigation which would otherwise have followed to test whether
the announced inherent illegality of clauses such as those in the case before
the Board might somehow be overcome through other express contract pro-
based its decision upon evidence of discriminatory administration of the provisions. Asso-
ciated General Contractors, Inc., 117 N.L.R.B. 1319 (1957).
The Mountain Pacific standards may now have received a legislative ratification in
the enactment of section 705 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 73 Stat. 545 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (Supp. I, 1959). The conference report on
that section states, "Nothing in such provision is intended to restrict the applicability of
the hiring hall provisions enunciated in the Mountain Pacific case, 119 N.L.R.B. at 893,
or to authorize the use of force, coercion, strikes, or picketing to compel any person to
enter into such prehire agreements." H. CONF. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
80. The majority said:
We believe, however, that the inherent and unlawful encouragement of union mem-
bership that stems from unfettered union control over the hiring process would be
negated, and we would find an agreement to be nondiscriminatory on its face, only
if the agreement explicitly provided that:
(1) Selection of applicants for referral to jobs shall be on a nondiscriminatory
basis and shall not be based on, or in any way affected by, union membership, by-
laws, rules, regulations, constitutional provisions, or any other aspect or obligation
of union membership, policies, or requirements.
(2) The employer retains the right to reject any job applicant referred by the
union.
(3) The parties to the agreement post in places where notices to employees and
applicants for employment are customarily posted, all provisions relating to the
functioning of the hiring arrangement, including the safeguards that we deem essen-
tial to the legality of an exclusive hiring agreement.
119 N.L.R.B. at 897.
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visions. To those who believed the former rule to be correct it would also
appear to be an attempt to legislate additional restrictions on the substance of
collective bargaining agreements.8 '
The change in policy made by the Board was of major proportions since
it outlawed the hiring hall provisions of many contracts, particularly in the
construction industry. Condemnation of such clauses, coupled with a pre-
existing Board policy of requiring unions and employers to reimburse em-
ployees for all dues and fees collected under an illegal union security provi-
sion, threatened both unions and employers with enormous financial bur-
dens.8 2 This would have been particularly true if the Board, following the
judicial analogy, had applied the new rule to all pending cases and to all
existing contracts having clauses which would have been valid under the
former rule.
The Board was in very large part saved from the necessity of assessing such
harsh consequences to contracts made in reliance on the former rule and on
events which had already transpired.8 3 Relief to unions and employers took
the form of a moratorium, declared by the General Counsel of the Board, upon
the processing of charges based upon illegal hiring hall clauses. His original
announcement was made in February, 1958; it established June 1, 1958, as the
date upon which the hiring hall clauses in existing agreements had to be
brought into conformance with the new standards which the Board had not
yet proclaimed! At the end of March, 1958, the Mountain Pacific majority
opinion was handed down. In April, the moratorium period was extended to
September 1, 1958. In August, the General Counsel announced another ex-
tension to November 1, 1958, for the benefit of those employers and unions
which had made "genuine efforts" to correct their union security and hiring
arrangements prior to the September 1 deadline. On November 1, 1958 the
time for full compliance finally arrived.84 In form the Board had done no
more than render a quasi-judicial opinion stating a change of law effective
immediately upon contracts previously executed. In fact, the evils of a retro-
81. Compare, Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agencies, 60 COLUm.
L. REv. 429, 442-43 (1960).
82. This is the Board's so-called Brown-Olds remedy, based upon the remedy ordered
in Plumbers Union (Browns-Olds Plumbing & Heating Corp.), 115 N.L.R.B. 594 (1956).
The validity of this remedy is to be determined by the Supreme Court this term in cases
in which certiorari has been granted to review the conflicting decisions of Courts of Ap-
peals. Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, cert. granted, 363 U.S. 837 (1960);
Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, cert. granted, 363 U.S. 837 (1960).
83. It does not appear that at any time during the General Counsel's "moratorium"
that the Board had any occasion to decide that execution and enforcement of collective
bargaining agreement with hiring hall provisions lacking the required safeguards consti-
tuted violation of the act in the absence of evidence that it was being enforced in a dis-
criminatory manner.
84. For a summary of these developments, see the speech of Jerome Fenton, the
NLRB General Counsel, before the Illinois State Bar Association's Labor Law Section.
43 L.R.R.M. 40 (1957).
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active effect of the change in law were avoided through the administrative
grace of the General Counsel. In short, as to parties other than those involved
in the suit the change in law was given only prospective operation; such
would have been the case if the Board had engaged in rule-making under the
Administrative Procedure Act, setting a delayed date for effectiveness of the
new rules.
For the parties to the Mountain Pacific decision the result was somewhat
different. They too were spared the heavy burden of reimbursement of fees
and dues collected under the contract, though no explanation was given for
this leniency.8 5 But their contract was declared illegal, and they were ordered
to cease giving effect to it and to post notices to employees stating that they
would cease their violations of law. In short, though things were not as bad
as they might have been for the parties to that case, they did play the sacri-
ficial role the Board assigns to parties whose cases are the vehicles for rule-
making activities conducted in the guise of quasi-judicial proceedings.
Upon the Board's petition for enforcement, and the respondent's petition to
review, the Mountain Pacific case was taken to the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit as NLRB v. Mountain Pac. Chapter of the Associated Gen.
Contractors, Inc.8 6 One of the principle arguments made by Associated General
Contractors, but unmentioned in the opinion, was that the Board had engaged
in illegal legislative rule-making in the course of deciding the case. 7 From
the failure of the court to deal directly with this argument in its opinion con-
flicting inferences may be drawn. Perhaps the court believed the argument to
be so unsubstantial as not to be worthy of detailed consideration. On the other
hand, it may have decided the case upon other grounds to avoid the difficulties
of a novel and knotty question.
In any event, the Ninth Circuit viewed the matter differently than the
Board. Basically, the court's disagreement with the NLRB was on the sub-
stantive issue of whether a hiring hall contract clause was legal if it did not
state the required limitations upon the union's powers. The court did not be-
lieve that the limitations were necessary for legality, but believed instead that
each case should turn upon its peculiar facts. The court recognized that an
employer might be held to have agreed to, and to have enforced, discriminatory
policies even though the contract contained no express discriminatory provi-
sions.38 More to the point with which we have been concerned, however, the
court also recognized that the Board's specialized knowledge and experience
might qualify it to attach peculiar weight to a certain type of evidence and to
draw an inference in a particular case that such a tacit discriminatory agree-
ment did exist. The court said,
85. The probable reason being that the General Counsel, not anticipating a change in
Board policy, had not requested such relief.
86. 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959).
87. Brief for Mountain Pacific Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of
America, pp. 17-30, NLRB v. Mountain Pacific, 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959).
88. 270 F.2d at 430-31.
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There seems to be no valid reason why an administrative body cannot
progress from precedent to precedent. The Board has now decided, in
view of its experience, that special significance must be given to the failure
to include protective clauses in these contracts. But such a rule of evi-
dence should operate prospectively, since the burden is thereby shifted.
This approach cannot be upheld in the instant case. But this Court sees
no reason why the doctrine once announced could not be applied in future
cases.
89
The cases was remanded to the Board for further consideration, apparently
of the factual matter-whether the employers had intended to enter into and
to enforce a discriminatory contract hiring procedure.
More recently the Board's Mountain Pacific rule has been rejected by the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. E & B Brewing Co. 0
The Board frankly admitted in its argument that it had adopted a new "rule,"
and that it had abandoned the case-by-case method of determining whether the
hiring hall arrangement was being enforced discriminatorily. The court, having
noted that the Board did not purport to base this new rule upon the rule-
making power given to it by Section 6 of the National Labor Relations Act,
bluntly stated, 91 "Perhaps the Board might have saved itself a lot of trouble
by utilizing this method of making a rule." It then proceeded to consider the
Board's development of the new rule through the process of administrative
adjudication. Recognizing that the Board's first interpretative decision need
not be its last, and that administrative rules may be changed retroactively, the
court applied the familiar test of whether the retroactive change of policy
would work a hardship altogether out of proportion to the ends sought.9 2
It found that it would work such a hardship; accordingly, it concluded that the
Board's action was "'agency action which we are directed by § 10 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act to set aside as arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse
of discretion.' "93
What conclusions may be drawn from this resume of the Board's change of
law concerning hiring halls? The substantive rule which the majority of the
Board desired to establish would possibly have received more favorable treat-
ment by the Ninth Circuit if it had been adopted in a formal rule-making pro-
ceeding under the Administrative Procedure Act. That court's comments on
the retroactive application of the evidentiary rule suggest that the acceptability
89. 270 F.2d at 432.
90. 276 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1960), petition for cert. filed, 46 LAB. REL. REP. 402 (U.S.,
July 29, 1960) (No. 211).
91. 276 F.2d at 598.
92. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
93. 276 F.2d at 601. The Court also held that lack of notice that the validity of the
hiring hall agreement was in issue deprived the Board of power to pass upon the issue
because section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004
(1958), requires notice of the fact and law involved in agency adjudications. 276 F.2d at
599. The Board has filed a petition for certiorari which is still pending. NLRB v. E. & B.
Brewing Co., petition for cert. filed, 46 LAB. Rym. REP. 402 (U.S., July 29, 1960) (No. 211).
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of the substantive rule was certainly not increased by its retroactivity. The
speculative comment of the Sixth Circuit also suggests a willingness to accept
a substantive rule which is formulated in accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act and made prospective only in its application. On the other
hand, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit approved the development
of the new rule, considering the effects of the change no different from those
which occur when, upon further consideration, a court decides to modify its
earlier views.9 4 The ultimate fate of the rule will soon be decided by the
Supreme Court, though whether the manner of it formulation will affect the
decision is a matter of speculation.9" In any event, it seems clear beyond the
point of argument that the turmoil created by moratorium periods and their
extensions could have been avoided by the use of such rule-making procedures.
ECONOMIC STRIKERS AND RULE-MAKING
One matter upon which there was substantial agreement during the con-
sideration of the Labor-Management Reporting and Reform Act of 1959 was
the need for some action to restore the voting rights of economic strikers
whose positions have been filled by replacements hired during the strike. This
had been the rule applied by the Board in administering the Wagner Act.
Reasoning that until the dispute was settled no one could predict which would
be entitled to the job, it had allowed both strikers and replacements to vote.
This Board-developed practice was rejected in the Taft-Hartley Act's addi-
tion to Section 9(c) providing that, "Employees on strike who are not en-
titled to reinstatement shall not be eligible to vote." 97 It soon became apparent,
however, that this restriction upon voting by economic strikers placed a potent
union-busting weapon in the hands of employers willing to utilize it.
Supported by President Eisenhower, the Senate Labor Committee recom-
mended that the sentence added to the National Labor Relations Act by the
Taft-Hartley amendments be deleted.98 The House proposed instead that limi-
94. NLRB v. Local 176, Bhd. of Carpenters, 276 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1960). The court
refused, however, to enforce that portion of the Board's order applying a Brown-Olds
remedy, see note 79 supra, on the ground that to do so with conduct which was recognized
to be illegal only after it had occurred would be an ex post facto penalty. 276 F.2d at 586.
95. The validity of the Board's hiring hall rule is now pending before the Supreme
Court in Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, cert. granted, 363 U.S. 837 (1960).
The opinion below by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia contains no dis-
cussion of effect of the manner in which the rule was formulated. 275 F.2d 646 (D.C. Cir.
1960). On the other hand, if the certiorari is granted on the pending petition of the Board
in NLRB v. E. & B. Brewing Co., petition for cert. filed, 46 LAB. REL. REP. 402 (U.S.,
July 29, 1960) (No. 211), the later question will almost certainly be reached upon argu-
ment.
96. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 32 N.L.R.B. 163 (1941). The decision reversed the pro-
cedure established by the earlier case, A. Satorious & Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 493 (1938), in
which only the economic strikers were allowed to vote.
97. 61 Stat. 144.
98. See S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-33, 56 (1959).
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tations be imposed upon the holding of elections following lawful strikes
not called to obtain recognition.99 The compromise language agreed upon by
the conference was:
Section 9(c) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, is
amended by amending the second sentence thereof to read as follows:
"Employees engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to rein-
statement shall be eligible to vote under such regulations as the Board
shall find are consistent with the purposes and provisions of this Act in
any election conducted within twelve months after the commencement of
the strike.' °
Certainly, the specific mention of regulations suggests the use of the powers
given the Board by Section 6 of the National Labor Relations Act to issue
"in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act."
The suggestion is given additional force by Section 606 of the 1959 Act: "The
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act shall be applicable to the
issuance, amendment, or rescission of any rules or regulations, or any adjudi-
cation, authorized or required pursuant to the provisions of this Act."''
The Board, however, has apparently not seen fit to utilize its substantive
rule-making powers in this area. On the contrary the Board's solicitor indi-
cated in a speech that instead the Board will proceed to develop the govern-
ing principles in the course of deciding individual cases.'0 2 This appears to be
the plan, though as the Solicitor's speech makes apparent, a considerable num-
ber of the problems involved have been exposed by the pre-Taft-Hartley ex-
perience; formulation of substantive rules, therefore, could be undertaken with
some confidence.
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION
The NLRB's view of its activities as involving only quasi-judicial functions,
and not substantive rule-making, is obviously untenable. The Board has clearly
99. H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., § 703 (1959), as passed by the House, 105 CONG.
REc. 15892 (1959).
100. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 702, 73 Stat. 542
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (Supp. I, 1959).
101. 73 Stat. 540 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 526 (Supp. 1, 1959).
102. Address of James V. Constantine, Briefing Conference of the Federal Bar As-
sociation and the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., December 10-11, 1959, 45 LAB. REIL.
REP. 231 (1959). See also 46 Analysis 41.
The solicitor apparently finds support for the case-by-case approach in some remarks
of Senator Kennedy during the Senate debate. In doing so, he appears to have overlooked
the statement of Senator Case of South Dakota, who made the amendment upon which
Senator Kennedy was commenting, that the amendment "put in the hands of the National
Labor Relations Board the power to issue regulations consistent with the act, which would
define the period of time and the status of the striker who could vote." 105 CONG. REc.
6533 (1959) (remarks of Senator Case of South Dakota). In any event, the debate was
directed toward language found in the Senate bilt before the compromise language of the
act was adopted.
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abandoned the quasi-judicial approach, and has engaged in substantive rule-
making with respect to the standards governing the exercise of its jurisdiction.
It likewise adopted substantive rule-making as the means of promulgating its
revised contract bar doctrine. That rule-making has in fact been the process
with respect to craft severance in representation cases, or with respect to the
limitations upon hiring hall agreements, is somewhat less certain, but here too
such a conclusion might legitimately be reached. The Board's view that the role
which it performs is one to which the rule-making process is not well adapted
is patently unsound. That process is exactly what the Board has used in at
least two, and possibly four, major areas of its work. Indeed, the sub rosa
formulation of rules in the guise of ad hoc decisions is eloquent testimony
to the necessity of utilizing rule-making powers for effective discharge of the
Board's obligations.
Brief consideration of the work load imposed upon the Board will make
apparent the impossibility of an ad hoc approach to the problems with which
it deals. Codification and standardization of its substantive rules is a matter
of necessity. During the fiscal year 1959, 12,239 charges of unfair labor prac-
tices were filed in the Board's twenty-five regional offices. After investigation
the General Counsel issued complaints in 2,101 cases involving unfair labor
practice charges. During the same year 9,347 petitions were filed for elections
to determine the representative status of unions. The five members of the
Board issued formal decisions in 2,883 cases, of which 764 were the relatively
complicated unfair labor practice cases. At the end of fiscal 1959 the number
of cases of all types pending at all procedural levels was 7,655.103 By compari-
son, the nine members of the United States Supreme Court disposed of only
1,787 cases during the 1959 term; they wrote full opinions in only 115 cases.
The Court had only 356 cases remaining on its docket at the end of the term.1i 4
An agency with a case load as large as that of the NLRB is understandably
under great pressure to state the full implications of any new development
or any departure from former precedents, even though such an explanation is
not necessary to disposition of the immediate case. To do otherwise is to invite
additional litigation to determine the extent of the new Board policy. And in
the area regulated by the NLRB, clients are notably eager to have counsel
experiment freely in determining the fullest limits of their powers and the
exact restrictions imposed upon the use of the weapons available to those whom
they view as economic adversaries. Changes occur frequently, if not through
amendment of the statute, through adoption of a new agency policy or accom-
modation of agency policy to the mandates of reviewing courts. If new poli-
cies are to be expressed in the piecemeal form of statements no broader than
those necessary to disposition of the immediate case, the caldron of litigation
becomes a nightmare version of that magic soup-producing pot of nursery
tales which flooded the streets of the town. Moreover, the sizeable field staff
103. 24 NLRB ANN. RF. 1-2 (1959).
104. The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARv. L. REv. 95, 99 (1960).
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must be instructed in the new policies so that the tremendous pending case
load will not have to be sent back for reprocessing after it reaches the Board
level. Finally, the Board deals with a vast number of cases involving similar
problems; unlike a body having only individualized and isolated contacts with
those problems it is in an especially propitious position to issue pronounce-
ments involving broad generalizations.
The question remaining is whether the Board's stb rosa rule-making is
a viable alternative to use of the procedures set forth in the Administrative
Procedure Act. Not a small element to be weighed is the possibility that the
Board's present rule-making activity is a violation of, rather than an alterna-
tive to, those rule-making provisions. One does not lightly reach the con-
clusion that a major agency of government has been operating in violation
of the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. But if the proposition
is taken as proved, what are and have been the consequences? Beyond our
concern for even technical departure by governmental authorities from the
standards established by law, the immediate threat is that important pro-
grams of the NLRB, affecting a multitude of employee, union, and employer
interests, may be upset and invalidated upon court review.
The Administrative Procedure Act provides a statutory basis for invali-
dating rules adopted without conformance to the standards established by
that Act. Section 3(a) of the Act 105 expressly requires publication in the
Federal Register of "substantive rules adopted as authorized by law and
statements of general policy or interpretations formulated and adopted by the
agency for the guidance of the public." It further provides: "No person shall
in any manner be required to resort to organization or procedure not so pub-
lished."
Section 4 of the Act requires that notice of proposed rule-making be pub-
lished in the Federal Register, and that interested persons be afforded an
opportunity to participate in rule-making through presentation of written
data, views, or arguments. 10 6 Section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure
Act offers a sanction against a short-cutting of this procedure; it provides
that a reviewing court shall
... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be ... (4) without observance of procedure required by law.10 7
At least one Court of Appeals has held that failure to publish a regulation
in the Federal Register rendered it invalid even as to one having actual
notice of the regulation. 08 Professor Davis is critical of the decision, 09 and,
105. 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1958).
106. 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1958).
107. 60 Stat. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1958).
108. Hotch v. United States, 212 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1954).
109. 1 DAvis § 6.10.
[Vol. 70. 729
NLRB RULE-MAKING
as he points out, other courts have taken a different view.110 On the other
hand, the Court of Customs determined in a recent decision "- that a finding
under the Antidumping Act of 1921 that dumping had in fact occurred con-
stituted rule-making for the purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Having reviewed the existing authorities, the court concluded that failure
to publish notice of the intended rule-making in the Federal Register ' 2
invalidated the finding even as to a party who had actual notice of the pro-
ceedings and had in fact participated in them. Noting that the principle of
prejudicial error had been incorporated in the review provisions of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, the court concluded that the purpose of that in-
corporation was not to repeal the express requirement that notice of intended
rule-making be published. 113 Contemplation of the chaos and confusion, the
frustration of legitimate private interests, and the calamitous sacrifice of
public interest in labor matters which would result from a similar decision
With respect to any one of the major areas of NLRB activity discussed above
strongly counsels against doubtful circumventions of the rule-making pro-
visions of the Administrative Procedure Act wherever they are applicable.
This stark possibility aside, the Board's failure to utilize rule-making pro-
ceedings presents few instances of harm clearly done or of opportunities fore-
gone. Determination of whether an agency should proceed in the development
of policy on an ad hoc basis or through the more formal route of rule-making
involves the exercise of judgment on a multitude of factors; among them are
the nature of the problem presented, the information available concerning
that problem, the practicability of formulating from that information a prin-
ciple of general applicability, the advantages to the public gained from pro-
mulgation of definitive guides, the necessity of speed in the disposition of
problems, the desirability of avoiding retroactive changes of law, and the
soundness or justice of the policy as developed in one manner or the other." 4
Such an exercise of judgment produces no black and white distinctions; it
yields instead results which are entitled to respect only as the product of an
informed discretion." 5
It might be thought that rules formulated pursuant to formal rule-making
procedures would not receive that deference accorded rules formulated in
110. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), rea'd
on other grounds, 350 U.S. 907 (1955) ; Air Lines Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB, 215 F2d
122 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Florida Citrus Comm'n v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Fla.
1956), aff'd, 352 U.S. 1021 (1957).
111. Elof Hansson, Inc. v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 922 (Cust. Ct. 1959).
112. Required by section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 238 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1958).
113. 178 F. Supp. at 930.
114. See Baker, Policy By Ride or Ad Hoc Approach--Which Should It Be?, 22
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 658 (1957). The leading case is, of course, SEC v, Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
115. Id. at 203.
19611
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
adversary proceedings and developed over time in a case-by-case process."1
But that deference, of course, would depend upon the formulation having
occurred in truly adversary proceedings, and not in disguised rule-making
proceedings. As has been shown, the sweeping rules which are the product
of much NLRB litigation are adversary in name only.
On a more pragmatic level, it seems clear that the NLRB's reliance on the
presumably ad hoc policy-making process has done harm to its own program
as well as to private and public interests in general. For example, while the
ad hoc approach may have been the necessary and proper means for develop-
ing early contract bar principles, it would hardly appear necessary or even
appropriate to a current reformulation of those principles. The contract bar
doctrines were developed by the Board apart from the statute, and were
utilized without major protest for as much as twelve years. During the early
years the interests of those who had to make agreements in reliance upon an
unsettled law may well have been properly sacrificed; the novelty of problems
in the area made certainty improbable and a flexible experimental approach
desirable. The necessity of continuing the experimental approach, with its
undesirable consequences upon existing relationships, appears to vanish after
twelve years of experiment and experience with a problem; the Board ac-
cumulated a wealth of basic data upon which broad principles and general
rules could be formulated with a certainty that formerly was lacking. In
short, this was not one of those instances where, in the words of the Supreme
Court,1 17 an ad hoc approach, with its necessarily retroactive application,
could be justified because "the mischief of producing a result which is con-
trary to a statutory design or to legal or equitable principles . . . [was]
greater than the ill effect of the retroactive application of a new standard."
Also, failure to use the rule-making process may actually have a deleterious
effect on the substantive standards finally formulated; these may be less sound
or just, even in their future operation. For example, the Board did invite
the filing of amicus briefs in the contract bar cases.'1 8 But it is doubtful that
an amicus brief, the arguments of which have been oriented to problems pre-
sented in the factual context of a particular case, could approach in value the
critical analysis which might have been given to a set of rules covering the
multitude of problems disposed of in the contract bar decisions, which would
have been proposed by the NLRB if it had complied with the Administrative
Procedure Act. Here was a golden opportunity to permit public participation
in the discussion of proposed rules derived from basic data available to all
in reported Board decisions. Moreover, the experience and vantage point of
private parties might have enabled them to point out defects in the details
116. Cf. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944); Fishgold v. Sullivan
Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 290 (1946).
117. SEC v. Chenery Corp., supra note 114; cf. Friendly, A Look at the Federal Ad-
ininistrative Agencies, 60 CoLum. L. Rtv. 429, 437 (1960).
118. See note 42 supra.
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of the proposed rules, or unforeseen and undesirable consequences likely to
result from them." 0
Indeed, viewing the Board's policy formulation activities as a whole one
wonders whether amicus briefs can ever aid that agency in formulating
broad and detailed policies as effectively as the wide-ranging public criticism
and analysis that is possible in rule-making. The precision of the analysis
and comments made must vary with the specificity of the proposal commented
upon. The peculiar facts of a particular case and the issues thereby suggested
in the light of former precedents must be a poor substitute for exposure of
the more detailed rules under consideration. In addition, parties filing amicus
briefs may well feel themselves restricted to the record compiled by others,
and thus refrain from introducing additional data bearing on the question.
And amici are certainly not likely to appear and offer assistance in the com-
pilation of a record before a trial examiner.
Moreover, an agency which views as its role the formulation of policy
solely upon an ad hoc basis may neglect entirely to seek the advice and com-
ments of other interested parties in making a decision of momentous im-
portance. Thus, the decision in the leading hiring hall case, Mountain Paci-
fic,120 appears to have been made without the assistance of amicus briefs.
To the extent that stare decisis controls agency action in subsequent, similar
cases, the assistance given to the Board when policy is formulated in this
manner is limited to the imagination and ability of the particular counsel
who happen to be involved in the proceeding. And if, as may have been the
case in Mountain Pacific,121 those counsel are not informed of the full scope
of the change under consideration, even they cannot offer their best efforts.
If the foregoing observations are sound, it would appear that the NLRB's
rule or policy formulating procedures have suffered from a lack of public
participation, the value of which even the Board has recently recognized.' 22
119. For example, in Boston Gas Co., 129 N.L.R.B. No. 46 (1960), the Board held
a contract invalid as a bar because its dues checkoff provision required an employee to
serve notice of revocation of his dues checkoff authorization on the union in addition to
his notice to the employer. According to the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Department,
adherence to this ruling will deprive almost all contracts of bar status because most unions,
relying on a 1948 interpretation given by the Justice Department to the pertinent section
of the Taft-Hartley Act, have negotiated contracts with provisions requiring such notifi-
cation, 47 LAB. REL. REP. 1 (1960). The Board has granted a rehearing in the case, 47
LAB. REL. REP. 41 (1960).
For another example, see the order amending the proposed form for a union security
clause originally suggested in Keystone Coat, Apron & Towel Supply Co., 43 L.R.R.M.
1251 (1959). See also William Wolf Bakery, Inc., 122 N.L.R.B. 630 (1958).
120. 119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1957).
121. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
122. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra. In addition to those indications that
the public participation possible through acceptance of anicus briefs has been useful, com-
ments on delegations of authority to regional directors to determine appropriate units in
representation cases were solicited from various parties, NLRB Press Release R-628, Sep-
tember 18, 1959, 44 L.R.R.M. 465 (1959), even though such a delegation would probably
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What has been the effect of sub rosa rule-making upon its strictly quasi-judi-
cial processes? They, too, may have suffered, though probably not to the
same extent.
A principal advantage of the ad hoc approach is that it permits considera-
tion of, and adjustment for, the individual differences and factors found in
particular cases. Under the Board's current practices the parties to the pro-
ceedings selected as the vehicles for announcement of changes in policy find
themselves swept into a maelstrom of argument ranging far beyond the facts
of immediate concern to them. In such a situation attention is not likely to
be directed to the peculiar aspects of what might otherwise be a relatively
unimportant case. Confirming this suspicion is the fact that courts have found
occasion to criticize the Board for its failure to consider the peculiar and dis-
tinguishing factors of particular cases involving its contract bar doctrine, 23
craft severance principles, 124 and hiring hall agreements.125
The flexibility and experimentation which are major virtues of the ad hoc
approach appear to have been lost in the rigidity of standards announced
in the supposedly ad hoc determinations. Indeed one wonders whether there
would not be greater flexibility if the standards were announced in rules
which through their generality, suggested the possibility of departures in
compelling circumstances. Any such loss of flexibility puts off the experi-
mentation and development supposedly enjoyed in ad hoc procedure until
the next occasion upon which the quasi-judicial forms are consciously dis-
torted in the undertaking of a new legislative program.
In addition, as has been seen, the loss of flexibility in each category of
cases has also entailed a sacrifice of private interests resulting from a retro-
active change in standards. The courts have upon occasion balked at approval
of the retroactive changes. 126 Moreover, selection of an individual case as the
be exempt as a matter of internal management or agency organization within the meaning
of § 4(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003(a)
(1958). The General Counsel issued an invitation to certain trade organizations and labor
unions to meet with him to discuss problems in connection with implementing the amend-
ments of the National Labor Relations Act made by the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959. NLRB Press Release R-630, October 4, 1959, 44 L.R.R.M.
521 (1959). Board Member Jenkins, serving as chairman of a committee to review Board
procedures also requested views of interested parties outside the agency, NLRB Press
Release R-635, though procedural rules are exempt from the rule-making provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act by § 4(a), 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1958).
123. Local 476, Industrial Workers v. McLeod, supra note 60.
124. NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., supra note 69.
125. NLRB v. Associated General Contractors, supra note 83; NLRB v. E. & B.
Brewing Co., supra note 87. But cf. NLRB v. Local 176, Bhd. of Carpenters, supra note
91.
126. E.g., NLRB v. Associated General Contractors, smpra note 83; NLRB v. E. & B.
Brewing Co., supra note 87. For two additional examples of Board failure traceable to its
attempt to give retroactive effect to a policy change, see NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.,
195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952) ; NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 225 F.2d 343
(8th Cir. 1955). But see NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 47 L.R.
R.M. 2260 (6th Cir. 1960) ; NLRB v. Pease Oil Co., 279 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1960).
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vehicle for announcing a policy change has usually resulted in substantial
delay in the disposition of that case, inflicting upon the parties to that case
the attendant turmoil and uncertainty which normally accompanies unsettled
labor problems.' 27 The delay and uncertainty caused by this adherence to the
judicial fiction seems particularly wasteful unless the pre-existing rules pro-
duced intolerable results. Even so, upon occasion the issuance of press re-
leases stating new policies has given evidence that changes through rule-
making could have been accomplished with greater speed and more expedi-
tiously than through policy formulation on an ad hoc basis. 2 '
Finally, the question arises of whether the Board's adherence to quasi-
judicial forms encourages litigation by those who hope that some peculiar
fact of their case will take it out of a rule, the general applicability of which
is somewhat clouded by its being enshrouded in the factual context of a
particular case.' 29 Formalized rules, of course, provide more definite guides
to conduct. To the extent that parties affected by formalized rules can chal-
lenge them by direct action against the agency,130 use of the formal rule-
making process may invite more litigation than would the ad hoc policy-
making process, which can be challenged only by tempting a violation of the
rule with its attendant penalties. On the other hand, formal rules made
specifically under the powers granted by section 6 of the NLRA might be
less subject to reversal on judicial review; they could be regarded by courts
as what have been called legislative rules-promulgated under a congres-
sional grant of legislative power-and thus immune from review so long as
they are within that grant of power.' 3 ' Whether ad hoc rules could gain the
benefit of section 6 authorization seems doubtful, since Congress has express-
ly conditioned that grant of power on compliance with A.P.A. procedures.
Of course, even ad hoc rules have received the benefit of deference which
courts have traditionally given policy determinations based on the cumula-
tive experience of the NLRB.132 But the Board's record with policies so
formulated has not been a complete success.' 33 If to an appraisal of the com-
parative abilities of the courts and the agency there were added the factors
127. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 45, 46 supra.
128. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 32, 36 and 77 supra.
129. Cf. Baker, Policy By Rule or Ad Hoc Approach-Which Should It Be?, 22
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 658, 664 (1957).
130. Cf. CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
131. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936) ; NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) ; 1 DAvis § 5.03, at 298-306. But cf. Addison v. Holly Hill
Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944).
132. See, e.g., Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 48-49 (1954); NLRB
v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1952) ; Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793, 800-03 (1945). For a discussion of this relationship, see San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1959).
133. E.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); NLRB v. Bab-
cock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); NLRB v. American Natl Ins. Co., 343 U.S.
395 (1952).
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that the rule had been exposed to criticism of those to be governed by it, that
it lacked retroactivity, and that it was stated in a form and generality which
eliminated the suspicions of particularized justice or injustice, the result
might well be a more discouraging immunity to judicial reversal.1 3 4
The possible avoidance of litigation should in itself be a substantial cause
of concern for an agency which has adopted disguised rule-making pro-
cedures to avoid the burden of ad hoc litigation. In this respect, the Board's
insistence that policy with respect to the voting rights of economic strikers be
formulated in adjudication 134 has overtones of a masochistic determination
to suffer under a massive caseload.
On the Board's behalf it should be noted that other factors have operated
to mitigate the consequences of its non-compliance with the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act. The specialized nature of labor law practice
and the publicity given through specialized labor reporting services to im-
pending Board action have probably produced as much or more awareness
of the intended action as is achieved by many other agencies which publish
notice of intended rule-making in the Federal Register. Very few persons
active or interested in the labor area are likely to have been misled by the
absence of rules in the Code of Federal Regulations. Complications of sub-
stantive law are necessarily so complex that the desire for a simple code in-
telligible to the untrained layman must be abandoned as unrealistic1 35
On final evaluation, however, it appears that the Board's reluctance to
utilize formal rule-making procedures constitutes an unfortunate failure to
realize the advantages of the administrative process available to an agency
with both quasi-judicial and rule-making powers. That failure has already
involved the Board in difficulties with its substantive objectives. The possi-
bility that an entire area of Board activity may be unsettled through its failure
to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act provides a strong caution
against continuance of disguised rule-making activity. An intelligent, selec-
tive adoption of rule-making procedure would aid the Board in the adminis-
tration of the Act, and would ensure greater success in the achievement of
its objectives.
In conclusion, a few general observations may be made on the currently
debated subjects of policy formulation and judicialization of the administra-
tive process. Unlike the Hector Memorandum, the complaint here made is
not that the NLRB has failed to formulate policies or to apply those policies
134. See Jaffe, Jvdicial Review, 69 HARV. L. Rxv. 239, 272-76 (1955).
135. However, the purposes of the Federal Register Act, 49 Stat. 500 (1935), 44
U.S.C. § 303 (1958), and the Administrative Procedure Act are frustrated to the extent
that administrative rules or regulations of general applicability cannot be found in the
Code of Federal Regulations. Absence of a comprehensive code stating the rules, sub-
stantive as well as procedural, of any agency contributes its bit to fractionalization of the
legal profession into groups of specialists, each familiar with general policy pronounce-
ments made by a particular agency in allegedly ad hoc decisions, but unable to work into
other areas of specialization. Cf. HORSMY, THE WAsHxNGTOx LAWYER 95-97 (1952).
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after formulation. Indeed, the evidence is to the contrary. In the case of the
NLRB then, a combination of the adjudicatory and legislative functions has
not prevented policy formulation. On the contrary, the combination of func-
tions has been of assistance in developing policies which could not have been
sensibly outlined without the exploratory work done on an ad hoc basis. The
details of the policies in either the contract bar doctrine 136 or the jurisdic-
tional standards surely would not have occurred to one formulating policy
on an a priori basis. The same observation seems sound with respect to hiring
balls. Inevitably, part of policy formulation must be given to the authority
which adjudicates. Moreover, the necessity of reformulating policies which
the Board has experienced in adjudication confirms Professor Jaffe's obser-
vation that the discretion used in formulating rules cannot be used but once
and then put back in the box.137 A continuous, sensitive response to the
problems of government is desirable on the part of the adjudicating authority.
Any attempt to transfer policy formulation to another body would involve a
substantial sacrifice of a coordinated approach and probably would be doomed
to fail.
On the other hand, the NLRB's exclusive reliance upon an ad hoc ap-
proach, while outwardly an acceptance of judicialization of the administra-
tive process, 38 has produced grossly unsatisfactory results. Probably one
would find similar results wherever the potential number of cases is large,
changes are frequent, the interests regulated are militant and litigious, and an
agency staff is in need of policy directives. Such a judicialization is certainly
not the solution to the problems which have raised the present debate. In-
deed it establishes that in at least some areas advocacy of an intelligent use
of the combined powers of adjudication and rule-making, though a tradi-
tional and perhaps unexciting proposal, has a greater appeal than a novel
and more drastic attack upon the problems of the administrative process.
136. See note 48 supra.
137. Jaffe, Basic Issue: An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1273, 1285 (1955).
138. The appearance of judicialization is further heightened by the separation of the
prosecutory function under the jurisdiction of an independent General Counsel. 29 U.S.C.
153(d).
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